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IN THE SUPREME· ·COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
srrATE OF UTAH,
Case No.

v.
lLA AHHENS,

12153

Def end ant-Appellant.

NATURE OF

CASE

rrhis is an appeal from a verdict of guilty to a charge
of ernhezzlPrnent in the District Court of Cache County,
State of Utah, and the sentence to the statutory period
of one to ten years with probation granted on the condition that defendant spend thirty days in the
jail and mak<> restitution in an undetermined amount.
'11he .Judgt- was District Court J ndgP YeN oy Christoffersen ( T. 22()).

RELIEF SOUGHrr ON APPEEAL
D<·fondant st>eks n•vpn..;al of tlw \'Prdict and judgment.

DISPOSrrrox 1K THE Lff\YEH COURT
The jury retltrned a YPrd ;d of gn
a:-; elrnr;.;i·d
of the crime of emhezzle111Pnt; j1:dt,111H•11t o!· in<·an·<·rati0 ;1
·for the sta.tntory period, w:th prohatim1
d 1111 1·!1i:was made
tlw eourt.

Ila Ahrens, a long tim<· employee ol' Logan
!11
various capacities, was charged by information on Oetuber. Q,
with having e111hezzle(l $11-±.00 frorn Logan
Cit)- on or about I\lay :20, IH69 (R. 9), to which
she entered a plea of not guilty. A bill of parti<'nlan
was demandPd and ordt>red hy tlw court (H. 11 ). 1'he
State answered the bill on .January 10, 1970, claiming
that the funds charged to havP lwen embezzl<'d wen• not
the proceeds of a cheek but constitut<>d ca:-;h tuk'.·n frn111
the Logan City general fund and tlH· (·em<>t<·n·
fund (R. 13).
'rhe testimony showed that on or about
19.
1969, one Vera Makin d<:>livered lwr cheek in the snrn
of
to Logan City Cernet<>ry (Exhibit 1)
to Austin Morgan, the Logan Cit:- Cenwtc>n· sexton (1'.
11, 12). On thP same day or the day following, Mr.
Morgan delivert>d the chec·k, togethPr with a c·Pmrtrn
card to Mrs. Ahrens at her desk in the Logan C'itY
offices (T. 17). He did not get a rash rC>gister rPC·(•ipt
for the check (T. 17); in fact, lw 1wver got a <'a:sh rt>g
ister receipt for cemetery fund ..; de liY<·n·<l to the Logan
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( 'ity offices <lnring th(' enti1'('

he had hee1i sexton

( T. '27, 28).

rr11e eheck was banked in the regular deposit for
tlw \\'et•k of
23, 1969, by Mrn. Bodrero, who handled
all deposibi for the Logan
offices and made the
d<,posi ts for the gene ml register on Thursday afternoons. An amount of $11-1.00 did not show on the cash
registPr tapP, nor did amounb of $82.00 for grave and
lot 1nm·hmw nor $32.00 fo1· }H'l'}Jdnal case. However,
thP elwck, stamp Pndorsed, was deposited ·with the regular dPposit of
23, 19G9. Proper entries wt>re .nade
in the lt>dg<·rs
. ..:\hrPns (
8), a receipt for
thr rwrpetnal care of tlw l\Iakin lots (Exhibit 3) was
signed by
Bodrero, and was received by Mrs. Makin.
Tlw ePmctery dt>t>d (Exhild :2) wa:::; signed
the Mayor
and City RPc>ordt>r and n·ct>ived
l\Irs. Makin (T. 13).
1
1 he elu•ck (Exhibit 1) endorsed hy Logan City Corporation went through the office of the Logan Branch of
the Fin;t Securitv Bank of Utah, and was duly paid
and r<>tnrrn•d to Mrs. l\Iakin with her bank statement
(T. 12).
prnple worked in tlw City offices, and six
of the seven liad acct>::>::> to and u:::;ed the ca:::;h rPgister
(T. 85). 'rhP ban1.;: dPposit was made only once a week
hy Mrn. Bodn•ro. Mrs. Bodrero n'mon'd the funds from
fop rash regist<•r ('ach
d('po:::;it<'d tlwm in a night
arnl brought the fnnd:::; back each morning.
TltPre was rwn•r a daily i'<•eoneiliation of funds. The
<·ash J't•µ;istPr \\'as mnlti-druwerrd; however, only one
8PVt'B

drawer was us<>d. Eac·li tilw• tlw c:ash n·gi stPr was rnng,
it registered on a tape; ho\\·en·r, thnv
110 syuliol
on either the rt>gister tapL· or
n·c-<•:pts to indiea'.1·
·\vho rang tlw regist(•r. The tesi.irnon:· ol" tlH' and:1.1)r :.u1d
Mrs. Bodrern ·was to tlw <·ffrd that a n·c-eipt m1s to hP
used each time thP cash n'gistl'l' \\·as rung; hoirPrer,
no reconciliation or instruetiorn.; \\·en· 1iroJ;:('<'<l r1
ing the nse of tlw eash n·giskr, 11or h:.1.cl a11y \\·i
instructed either l\lrs. AJin·ns or otlwr <'lllJiloyl•es as to
the use of the cash registeJr. :\lr. Morgan, the C('llH'tery
sexton, testified that ht' had HPver receivPd a reg;::;ter
rceipt at any time siuct• he had bet·n ading in tliat
capacity, but that he did
a handwrith•n rt>ceipt 1·ad1
time when it was
to him.
All six persons who used the r<·gister, including the
defendant, took the stand :incl dl·n!ed nndt'r oath that
they had misapprnpriated any funds at any time.
There was further testimony on•r objection hy tl1e
defendant regarding a deposit that didn't reconeile on
or about the 20th day of J mw, 19()9, on thl' State's c!aiw
that it was a similar trammdion. H<n\'('\"<'r, 110 u1orn·:
was mi3ittg on the June transaction.
·ni.t-'&<- ;.u:;

,,----

Mrs. Bodrero drew for the jun· a skt'tch of the
City offices showing tlw placing of t11e <:ash n·gistl'r
and the desks of
various
"·ho mwcl th<>
ister (T. lt/5). When the :-s<·cond day of' trial
tlw
prosecutor infonnt'd the eourt and d<'f°PllS(' eoun::-Pl tlial
it had bt>t'n reported to him that om' of

jurors hail
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!wen to the City offices that morning looking over the
offices, and had talked to several of the employees, some
of wholll had been witnesses. rrhe court called the juror
into chambers, tinestioned him under oath, but without
a n'JHH'tt•r. He admitted going down to see for himself
what the offices looked like to compare them with the
diagrarn, and admitted talking to several people in the
offices. Counsel for the defendant made a motion for
a nustrial, which
took under advisement, see
affidavit supplementing the record (R. ________ ). At the
ronclusion of the morning testimony the second day,
the court conducted further hearing in chambers (T. 17117G) wherein Donna Bodrero testified that the juror
had come into the offices, had talked to her, had talked
to \' enal .Tones and to two other female employees. He
talhd to l\Irs. Bodrero about the defendant, Mrs. Ahrens,
and inquired who she (Mrs. Ahrens) was responsible to.
He also inquired as to when• .Mrs. Ahrens sat, and
compared the layout of the offices with the chart drawn
Bodrero. Mrs. Bodrero answered his questions
as to who Mrs. Ahrens was responsible to and kidd('d
witl1 thP juror about "splitting"
which were
lying- on Mrs. Bodrero's <l(·sk ( 1'. 172). :\lrs. Bodr('ro
had pn·vionsly tl,stified that the
times she handled
tJ1p rPg-ister morn·ys wen• making thl'
deposit
and on a reconciliation with the tape on Thursdays. The
juror also discussed whether
conld se<' Ila from
any of tlw other officPs" rr. 17.f). :\Irs. Bodrero also
indieat(•d that the juror ha<l gone completely through
the offices and had talked with l\fr..TonPs and two of
thP fomalC' employePs, and had told one of the female

G

employees that he had se('ll <'\·prytliing an<l wa::; ::sorr 1
for Mrs. Bodrero.
Defense counsel rna<ll' a motion for m strjal, wl1ir:li
was denied by the court (T. 11"4-ll(i), though the eow·t
affirmatively stated that tl1l' juror was guilty of mioconduct (T. 176). Duane Beck, City Auditor, t<'s;iJicd
that an audit showed cemdery clH:cks without suvvorting cash register receipts or vouchers on se\·eral owisions after Mrs. _AJ1rens ('emwd to be l'rnployed at thi.·
office Cl1 • 12:2). The court also admitted over objcdion
evidence regarding a handwritten l'l'c:eipt by .Mr:s.
to Elva S. rraylor, Mrs. Taylor testifying that ::;Jw Jrnd
requested thl' receipt for incorne tax lJlll'lW:Se::; as a pnvious receipt \Vas in trust in her deceased Jrnsban<l'1
estate ( T. 181), such testimon:i· being prejudicial to thl'
defendant but in no way
connected either in time
or by n10dus operandi wit]1 tlil.:' claiuwd
20 sl10dage.
The court further allowed ovvr objection the prosecutor's motion for a jury view of the City office:.; after
the one juror had taken it upon himself to mak<' a
sonal investigation.
AHGFME.NT
POINT I.
IF A CRIME HAS BEEN SHOWN UNDER PLEADINGS AND THE EVIDENCE, IT WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE BEEN LARCENY AND NOT EMBEZZLEMENT.

The defendant was c:J1arged h>· information witli
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1·111lw:;,:d(•!ll('llt of funds of Logan City in the sum of

I-LOO, \\·liid1 slil' had iJ1 l1t'l'
and control
Ji:-· Yirtiw of ht>r trnst contrary to 76-17-2, Utah Code
.\1rnotat('d
(H. V). TL(' hill of particulars (R. 13)
fill'd h)· the State specifically deniPd tliP appropriatioll
of the Vera .l\lakin check (Exhibit 1) and affinnatively
all(•gPd the def\_•ndant took "C"asli consisting of fnrnls from
tlw gennal fund and the ct•nwtery trust fund."
'!'lien· is no evidence to show that defendant ever
liacl eustddy or control of tht.• "gPneral funds" or the
"cemetery trust funds."
.\ll tlit' (''·idence shows tklt Exhibit 1, thP
«!1tTk, d(•liv('l't>d to the defendant h)· Austin Morgan
\\·as dPposited to the acC'onnt of Logan City, paid hy

tli(· !Jank from th(' i\Iakin aecount, and tlw canceled check
l'PttmH'd to i\Irs. l\Iakin, SPe Exhibit 1 and rr. 12, )frs.
testi111on:\. Also, J.lrs.

n•c(•ivPd

for both tliP purchase of the gnlYe and lot (Exhibit 2)

and for tlw peqwtual care fep

3).

Tl1P d<·fendant \ras sp(•ciliC'ally employed, bonded
and paid as Dc·pnt_\· Cit)· RPcordvr (Ex hi hit 11) the oath
of offieP, and the tPstimon:-· of City Auditor and RPr·oru<•r, Duarn• Beek (T. 107, lOS). In sneh
she
had 110 eustody of or eontrnl of Pitlier the general fond
or tl1P ('( 111C't<'r:-· fond (
1

Cod<· Annotat<•d 1

10-10-GO through 63, Utah

as m11('n<led h>· I'·

1), that enstody lwing plaC'Pd with

(i1,

Chapter 24,

the City Treas-

urn PX<'lusin·l>· hy 10-10-ri-±. 1Ttali Cod(' .\m10tated

8
as amended by L. 01, Chapter :24, :-)Pc. 1. Howev<:·r, th<·
defendant wm; appaH•ntl;-·, ill ad<lition to liN :-statutor:
job, a "jack of all work," i1iclwling handling the ::;witcJ:.
board, acting as receptionist, and togetht>r with 1:-\0lllP fo,.
others received moneys for parking meter fint>s, ,·ariou'
licenses, taxes, cemetery funds and fePs. .J[rs. Bodn·111
was the Ci fr•' Treasurer and had been sinct' J anuan. J
1969 (T. 35); as such, she was by statute custod:an o:
funds, 10-10-G4, Ftah Cod(' Annotatt><l, supra. l\lrs. Bo.
drero took the funds t>ach night, deposited tlwm in tlH·
night deposits, returned them in the mornings. n (·011ciled all registers once lWr wet>k, made> d0posits and
kept the books and rPcords (T. 35-GO and T. 7S-SO).
There is no evidence in the record of an;-· depm:
treasurer or assistant treasurer.
The treasurer by her own tPstimony had rn·\·pr given
any person, and more particularly had never given the
defendant, any instruction as to tlw procedure in handling
the cash register or the nt>cessity of making cash ref!·
ister receipts for checks hrought in by th<-> cPuwt<'r:
people (T. 84-85).
There is no evidence that tlw dPfrndant r<>c<-'ir<'d
any cash or other receips during tlw we<"k of May 17 t11
:May 23, 1969, other than the check ( Exhibit 1) which
was unequivocally shown to han-' lwen cl<•posit<'d to tlw
account of Logan City.
The only inferenct• that can
drawn from tlw e\'idence is that someone, either the dl'fernlant or :-:oH 11 '

9
other
look ca8h in thL ar11ount of the che<·k from
1l1(' rl'µ;istcir at the time the check was placed in the
n'gister or at some time hehYeen that time and the
tinw of tlw bank depm;it on
23. This could hav(•
lwr·n :lll.'\ of the persons using the register, Qr the City
Trea:snrer on anv
nio-ht
anv• mornin<r
or on tlH"' Tirnrs•
0
'
h!
day reconciliation and deposit.
1

This <'onrt i11 JlcJiilli11 c. [:,'merlJ, 59 Utah 553, 205
P. S!.JS, ill eousidering the qnestion of who is an officer
or otlH'r person charged with reeeipt, safekeeping or
tr:rnsf Prring public fnnds sets forth th<"
pro,·isions as to officers in this State, then states ( aftN
a eitation of authorities) at page 899:
"rl1hese eases all hold that criminal statutes should
not be ::so interprPtc<l as to Pxtend their h'rms
merp construction to apply to pt>rsom; or things
not clearly within their deseriptive terms."
Tl11· eourt µ;oPs on, citing from State c. J/ e.1J<'rs 1 5n Ohio

St.

47 NE 138:
''State v. Meyers, supra, was a casl' :similar to
the one we now have under coHsidPrntion. In
that ease one J olm \Y. Jh-'yPrs was diarged, as
a depnt>·
tn·ast1r<'r, \\·ith tl11:-· PmlwzzlPrnt•nt
of pnblic money, under the proYisions of a statute
which wa::s
thP salllt' as thP onP umkr
whieh tlw plaintiff is lu•rp eharged with having
violated. The Ohio Snpn-•me Court in tlH-'
taS<' IH·ld that thP provisions of t!H' Ohio statutr
did not apply to a
tn asun·r. Tn eo1111ll<'nting- llJHHI tlw provisions of th1 statntP lwforp
it the Ohio eon rt said: 'It will lw notieed that by
1

1
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its terms ::s<'ctio11
1::; n'strietl'd in it::; apjJlication to pen;om; w110 ure "clta1·gl'd \\·it11 rn.L\tion, receipt, ;-;a:iekn,piug,
01· cii •. i;ui·.;l'ment of the 1mblie rnulll' y.
F rnrn LJ il'•'I'
provisions it ::seem::; n'asonaLly (', rtain lJi:tL i· ,.
persons who are s·dbjcd to Jll'l>Sl'tl!ti011 ,,i:.;1·1
section 6841 are tl10;-;e only \d10 are c11<11N d iJ.,
law \\'ith the perfonnanee of tliv dlltie:s, <l; .::1rn;,
of them, therein mentioned.'
''The court then JH'Occ•Pds, afkr finding that rnul'I'
the Ohio statute a county treasmer i::s specifil'ally charged \\'ith the duty of the re<.'.Pi1it,
kee1Jing, and clisLurnllllL'Ii.t uf irnblic 111011e.', tu
say: 'But we havP found no lH'ovision of law Ii:
which a deputy or elerk of a co1mty treasm<·r
charged with the lX'rfonuance of any of the duti1'i
* * * enumerated. The law goes no furtl1er tlnrn
to authorize the treasnrer, at hi::; plea::;ur(', t11
appoint one or more de1mties, who hold their
appointment only dnring the pleasure of thl' wincipal, who is answerable for tlw in·oceedings and
misconduct of the d('1mty, and
for his O\\"ll
protection, take a bond with snreties for the faithful performance of the ::services re<p1ired of tlw
deputy; but the latter takes no oath of offiet>, 11or
gives bond to an:· public authority, and
;n 1111
sense a public offiC'er, hut a mne agent of tk
treasurer.' Citing l\lech<'lll, Puh. (Hf., Purngrapl1
38 * * * 'There may lw Pvery rPason why a d<>pnty
who misappropriates tlH• public mon<-'Y s11ould lw
punished to the sanw extent that a principal inar
be for a like act; and, if he cannot lw nnd<'r othr'r
sections of statute, adequatP
to t!Hd
end should bP vrovided.'"
The court goes on at pag(' 900:

11
··_..\]] of the foregoing eases cited by the plaintiff
S<•Pm to be of bk<, irnpol't. r1_1}ie principles anJlOllllC('d by them that eriminal statutes should
he held to apply in only those eases wherein tlw
transactions eomplained of are elearlY within their
meaning, and that as to persons the 'a(·cust'd must
belong to the class to which their proYisions are

'vitJ1iB tlieir 1 11eaniug, Mnc4
Rs tQ IH!1•tlin :llQCn1itYgQ lHlH't fle lo11g tu tlre: elttBB to « lticlr
their
ar@ elt"ttt +,a made to apply, we

think is cnot only sound legal dodrint>,
harrnonins with our statutory
. rules of
tion rP(llliring criminal statutes to be
preted as to effect their objects and
j nstiee."

hut fully

construeso interpromote

iwrson other than the City Treasurer or
r1 rC'as;;n•r \\'ho l'PllloYed fnnds from the cash regi ,;ter would lH• guilty of larcen >' ratlwr than em lwz,zlt-1

11wn t.
cas<· of State v. Tuylor, Utah (19G3), l-± Utah
107, 37S P.2d 35:2, dt'tPrmines the diffrrence between
lan·<·n>, and embezzlc·ment and holds that a person is
PHtitl(•d to be charg< d \\-ith a siwcific crime so that he
may know th<> natnre and cnuse of the accusation against
1

him. Citing- from pap;P 10!) of the Utah citation:
'' F'nndanwntal in th<· nature of PmlwzzlemPnt is
tl1P roming into poss<'ssion of ]H'Opert:(,'T)Y virhw' '"'c,
of on<>'s trust,' 7G-l7-2 and 7G-17-7, lfC.A.
C :·. (I ih,on v. StatP. Oki. Cr.,
P.2d 718 ( 1958):
HPmphill \'. Stat<', 222
!)l(i, 7G So. :!d 512
(1954); .Jaekson v. StatP, 211 .Miss. 828, 5:2 80. 2d
!l14 (lD:Jl ), and th<•n ('011\'<•rting it to one's own
nsP in violation of that trust. PPoplP v. Siehofsky,

L

'd7
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,. ., < 58 Cal. App. 257, 20S P. 3-10 (1922);
· 1

The

'·

• ·People, 109 Colo. 89, 12:3 P.2d 308 ( 1942) ; l't'OJlli·
.v. Bergman, 2-!G Mich. G8, :224 N.\V. ;fi5 ( lU:!;J):
Gradsky v. State, Miss., 137 8o.2d 820 (
State v. Smith, 2 vVash. 2d llS, 98 P.:2cl lii
(1939); Burdick, Law of Crime, 1.:mbezzlcinciit,
sec. 581, p. 384, Matthew Bender and Co., .\lh\ii\.
N. Y. (1946); 29 C.J.S. Ernbt'zzlemeut, 1;ar;1.
graphs 1 and 4, pp. 670 and 672 ( 19-H).
in contrast to situations where, as here, thl'
tial wrong is committed in obtaining po .
of the property. State v. Joseph, G3 Ptah 1,
P. 850 (1923); People v. White, 124 Cal. ..:\p[J.
12 P.2d 1078 (1932); Gibson v. State, supra,
P.2d 718 note 4; Riley v. State, 64 Old. Cr. lO:J,
78 P.2d 712 (1938); People v. Berlin, 9 Utah 3:{J.
35 P. 498 (1894); Lewis V. People, 109 Colo. s:i.
note 5, 123 P.2d 398, supra; State v. Smith,
Wash. 2d 118, note 5, 98 P.2d 647 supra. \rhen·
the intent to take the property of anotliPr ii
formed before the taking, and is coupled \rill1
some deception or trick to acquire possvssion of
the property, the crime is not embezzlement.
Phelps v. State, 25 Ariz. 495, 219 P. 589
Gibson v. State, 328 P.2d 718, note 4, supra; Bivens v. State, 6 Okl. Cr. 521, 120 P. 1033 (1912):
State v. Smith, 2 Wash. 2d 118, note 5, 98
647, supra. See State v .•Joseph, 63 Utah 1, not('
6, 221 P. 850, supra; Lewis v. People,
Colo.
89, note 5, 123 P.2d 398, supra; 18 Arn. Jnr .
Embezzlement, Sec. 3, p. 573 ( 1938). OnP ronld
not embezzle that which he had alread>· stolru.
Since the State did not prove the eharg-P upon
which the conviction is grounded it_ is n"versed.''
further statf's at pagf' 108:
"In a criminal proceeding it is not sufficit•nt to
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show merely that the accused has been cfo;honest,
or that he is a cheater, or otherwise of bad character. He is entitled to be charged with a specific crime so that he may know the 'nature and
cause of the accusation against him.' Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 12. See also Boynton v.
Ohio, 184 N..1£. 2d 377 (1962); State v.
Dormitzer, 123 Or. 1G5, 261 P. 426 (1927); State
v. Courtney, 10 Utah 2d 200, 350 P. 2d Gl9 (19GO);
and State v ..Myers, 5 Utah 2d 3G5, 302 P. 2d 276
( 195G). 'rl1e State must prove :;mbstantially as
charged (for discussion as to variances of form,
immaterial, as compared to variances of substance', material, see State v. Myers, footnote 1
above; and State v. Pettit, 97 Utal1 44:J,
P.2d
G75) the offense it relies upon for conviction.
Cf. State v. Harcombe, 48 Utah 89, 158 P. 1096
(1916); and see State v. Laris, 78 Utah 183, 2
P.2d 243 (1931); Leonard v. People, Colo., 369
P.2d 54 (1962); Moody v. People, 65 Colo. 339,
176 P. 476 (1918); State v. Wood, 188 Kan. 833,
3G5 P .2d 1080 ( 1961).
lt is apparent herein that the crime , if any, shown
by the evidence in the present case vrnuld show a larceny
unless the money was taken by the City 'I1reasurer. A
larceny requires showing of asportation or act of taking;
the crime of embezzlement does not. See 7G-l 7-S, Utah
Code Annotated 195:3.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AFTER UNEQUIVOCAL
TESTIMONY THAT A JUROR HAD RECEIVED EVIDENCE OUT OF COURT BY HIS OWN
GATION BOTH IN THE VIEWING OF THE CITY
OFFICES AND TALKING TO TWO OR MORE WITNESSES ABOUT THE CASE.
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Prior to the eourt eo11v(·rn11g on Uw sceon<l day 1,
the trial, the eonrt and <ll'l'ew:p <'Ot<m:d Wt'r(• in1orn 1:,,
hy the attorney for tla· StatP, Mr. Pr<•ston, that .:\Ir.,
Bodrero, onP of th<·
pri11ei1rnl
Jw,l t11:
11im that orn· of tilt> j11rors had lwen to the {'it;.- oiT\1··
that morning; had gone
tJ:" pn·n1isPs: <11:d b1.
talked to at least thn•(• of tlw <·mplo;.-('('S wlio kul l:i·1·
or would be witness<'l'l in the case.
Judge Christoffrrson ('alled the juror into eharnher,
and, in the pr<>s<'nee ol' both co1ms<>l and tlw defcrnlant
questioned the jnrnr nndPr oath.
Unfortunately, tht-se procePdings wer<> not rvpor!f·,
but a stipulation as to what transpin·d
pnt in wri1
ing and signed by the court and both counsd as a suppk
rnent to the record on app<•al (see (R. ________ ).
The juror admitkd that h(• had go1w to the C'it1
offices to satisfv
his curiosity• n·o·ardino·
a <lia<rram
dra1111
•
b
b
ri
on the blackboard during tlH· trial by witrwss Donm:
Bodrero; admitted talking to s<'vnal emplo:·<·e:-; i11eluil
ing witness Bodrern: dt'ni<>d that he l1ad talkPd abo1i1
the case; and told the eourt that he could ddc>rrnine tl1 1
case solely from Pvidenee n•e<>ived in court and not hi
influenced hy his trip to the City offi('<'S.

DPfernw conrn:<>l 11toYPd for a mistrial; the conrt tool:
the motion under advisenwnt and at tlw noon

'

called Mrs. Bodrero into <'hamlwrs and,

i11

tlw

prP:'(' 111 '

of both counsel and the dPfrmlant, qrn•::-;t!<rned tlw

1111

1
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nest:>. lier testimony us set forth at T. 171 thron6·h 17:3.
That tesfonony <liffers co11siderably from that of the
jnror. Mrs. Bodrero frankl)· admits that he talked to
li<!r about the case. He
her about who Ila
( tlw ch·J'('n<lant) was responsible to, and she answered
(T. 17:.::). 11<· loohd owr th<· plan of the offices and
eou11iared it with the chart she had drawn (T. 172). He
inq11in·cl of another employee as to wlwre Ila (the defendant) sat. He went through witness Beck's office
\rhil<' Beck was sitting tlwn· ( T. 173). He talked to
\'(•nal .Toll('S
173). HP talkPd to Mrs. Bodrero about
City
she had setting on lwr desk. Ht'
to
.J[ rs. BoclrPro, "Y 011 ean 't see Ila from any of
')ffif·f•s," and she replied, "X o not directly," they're just
at an angle enough.

rr.

The latter statemPnt diredly concerned Mrs. Bodrero's testimony the previous day Cl1. 45, 4G) concPrning tlw plan of the officps wht•re Ila sat and the view
from tlw various offices. 'l'lH juror left with the corntnent, ''Y< s, I have seen it all ancl I feel sorry for Donna
Bodrero." DPfr11se connsel rPne\Yed his motion for a
111istrial. Th<· <·0111'1, \dtilP affirrnati\·ely stating, "I agree
that it is a11 authorized C'Ontact and is misconclnet on
thP part of the juror, shouldn't lw done, and it is not
r·.ondnei \'P to n•cPi ving the PvidPnce that he should con:;idPr in arriving at a decision, that it is outsid<' of tlw
1
·r11 1rt.''
tlie eonrt df'nPd tlw motion for mistrial (T.
1

1

17+). TltP court Prred.
law in Ftah is ch·ar. 1'nder tlw Ftah Constitn-
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tion, Article I, Section 12, an accused is entitled to a
trial by impartial jury. The court in State v. Anderiiun,
65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, discu:sses the matter fully. J11
that case a juror rode to and from trial with the pr llcipal witness of the State. Both the juror and the witness filed affidavits that they had not <liHcu:ssed the tr:aJ.
The court denied defendant's motion for a lllistrial, and
the Supreme Court reversed, using the following la11
guage:
"\Ve may absolve the witnesH
from in a1n
way attempting to influence the juror hy tlw
courtesy shown him, and likewise concede that
the juror was not consciously affected in rend(·ring his verdict by the favors which he had n·ceived; but, in our judgment, such conduct cannot
and ought not be approved, or a verdict rendPred
in such circumstances allowed to stand.
"Authorities are cited holding that it is a matter
of discretion with the trial court whether a nrw
trial should be granted based upon misconduct
of a juror, and a state of facts could readily he
assumed under which an appellate court should
not interfere with the discretion exercised by tlll'
trial court in denying a motion for a new trial
based upon the alleged misconduct of a jnror.
But as we view the record in this case-, the appellant' was denied a constitutional ri b1rht to ht> trieJ
.
and convicted, if convicted, by an impartial .JUl'Y,
as that term is used in thP Constitution and Ii
construed by courts.
tJie
"Judgment reversed and cause
to. ·,
district court of 8Pvier county, with d1r!'ct 1011·
to grant a new trial."
The court also f->xtensively n•views the law to tlll'

t7
(•ffeet tl:c1 t tllik'S8 the State shoy\·s the matter· fd 'be ':honpr('j ndieial beyond a reasonable doubt, it is bevond the

ennrt's discretion to deny a mistrial.·

.

The Anderson case cih•s Mattox v. United
14G l'.S. at page 150, 13 S. Ct. 53, 36 L. Ed. 917:

'

communications, possibly prejudicial between Jurors and third persons, or witnesses or
the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden
and invalidate the verdict, at least ·unless thei;
harmlessness is made to appear."

In State v. Cra11k, 105 Utah 332, 142P.2d17fi (1943),
the eourt in approving State v ...Anderson, supra, states:
"The authorities, however, all agree that any conduct or relationship between a juror and a party to
an action during trial that would or might, consciously or unconsciously, tend to influence the
judgment of the juror authorizes and requires the
granting of a new trial, unless it is made to
appear affirmatively that the judgment of the
juror was in no way affected by such relationship, or that the parties by their conduct waived
their right to make objection to such conduct
* * *. But it should also be remembered that,
when a juror is selected by reason of his impartiality to determine not only the property rights
between individuals, bnt in criminal cases the
personal liberty of individuah; charged vvith
off em;es, the law requires of the juror such conduct during that time that his verdict
be
above suspicion as to its having been influenced
hy any conduct un his part during the trial * * *."
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Shepardizatiou of Stah• v. Anderson, supra, and
-.State v. C.rank, supra, as to misconduct of jurors, haw
not, been, reversed and have been distinguished only in
the.case of State v Anderson where the Utah Supre 111 p
.Court .in Gla,zier c. Cram, 267 P. 188, a civil lilwl t:1uit,
cites State v. Anderson but denied a motion for mistrial
not on the question of prt>judice but on the basis that
counsel for· the defendant, having full kno\dt:-"dge of tlH·
juror's misconduct, waited until after Vl'rdict to mow
for mistrial.
-:'r

It would appear clear that the law in this State not
only prohibits juror-witness contact and discussion, but
infers that it is prejudicial even in
cases as
v. Anderson and State v. Crank where either testimon)
or affidavits by all parties concerned indicate that thr
juror-witness contact had nothing to do with tlw trial,
while the instant case there can be no qtwstion that no!
only evidence regarding the trial was discussed outsidP
court, but that evidence was highly material to tlte c<w.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE
OF OTHER TRANSACTIONS BOTH BEFORE AND
AFTER THE CRIME CHARGED, THOUGH NOT
CONNECTED WITH THE CHARGED OFFENSE OR
SHOWING MODUS OPERANDI OR INTENT.

The court allowed, over defense eounsel's objections
beginning with the State's opening statement, a
o.f a failure to reconcile a bank statement on or about
the 20th of June, 1969, though no HlOIH'Y was sho\\'ll tu

·19
have !wen
and forthei· allowed evi:de-nte' of tlw
sending of a receipt for $50;00 to Mrs. Elva Taylor
(.1£xhihit
which "'as admittedly for reimbursement
from hPI' ]ms hand's estate ( T. 181) with no claim or
proof of money missing from Logan City. While the
defenda11t (ti<l 1wt object to Exhibit 29 as objection would
only emphasize tl1e error, t11e defendant's objections to
the State's opening statement (T. 6) and the argument
tJ1(•reon ont of fop presence of tht> jury
8 through 10)
mnst <'Onstitnte a continuing ohjection.

SUMMARY
'\VP r<•sp<•ctfully submit that the points above set

fortl1 1uust c·onshtnte l'PVPr8ible error.
First, if a crime was co1mnitted by the defendant
or hy anyom· other than the City Treasurer, that crime
urn st 1weessari ly he larceny rather than embezzlement,
8tak 1;. Taylor, supra.
Secondly, the misconduct of the juror is patent.
The trial eo nrt n•cognized the misconduct; the evidence
recPind t•xtrajndieially hy the' juror was both material
and prejudicial.
thP <·vid0ne(• of transaction8 other than the
crime <'l1arµ;(•d was ohjectc>d to qS early as the State's

opening stnh•rnp11t, and. q good part of tlw evidence
received tlierPafter related to incidents in June (the
Bevau fra11saetion) and in MarC'h (tlw rraylor

where it was neitlwr claimed nor
lest any money.

]ffOYed tliat Logan Cih

We respectfully request a reversal.
Respectfully submitted,

HATCH,
RICHARDSON & KlNGHOm
By SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorneys for Defenda11fAppellant
707 Boston BuildingSalt Lake City, Utah 84111

